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Musical Modernism, Sanitized 
 
By Björn Heile 
 
Music and Decadence in European Modernism: The Case of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Stephen Downes. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010. Pp. xiv + 371. $95.00 (cloth). 
British Music and Modernism, 1895-1960. Matthew Riley, ed. 
Farnham: Ashgate, 2010. Pp. xvi + 329. $124.95 (cloth). 
Musical Modernism at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century. David 
Metzer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. x + 254. 
$93.00 (cloth). 
 
These three books on musical modernism--or music and modernism-- 
cover, chronologically, the period from 1860 to the immediate past 
and, geographically, the area from Britain through Western Europe 
(excluding the Iberian Peninsula) to Central and Eastern Europe. 
This breadth is testimony to what Ben Earle in British Music and 
Modernism, 1895-1960 aptly calls an “odd counter-movement” to the 
anti-modernism which dominated Anglo-American musicology during 
the late 1980s and 1990s, whereby “recent commentators have been 
falling over each other in their haste to make more or less any 
late nineteenth- or twentieth-century music available to receive 
this label [modernism]” (301). Earle is more concerned with the 
 
fraying edges that appear in considerations of earlier periods of 
music, as well as with the genre of the symphony, but the same 
note of caution could be raised regarding the opposite 
chronological boundary. Music studies have traditionally employed 
a broader concept of modernism than most neighboring disciplines, 
typically, for instance, regarding postmodernism as an aspect of 
modernism and concurrent with it, rather than as its successor. 
Although I broadly sympathize with this position, there is a 
danger that the label may lose its critical edge as the historical 
as well as stylistic and generic boundaries of musical modernism 
become ever wider. Aspects of these books under review illustrate 
the danger of such a position.     Let us begin with Stephen 
Downes's book on decadence. There is no mistaking the significance 
of this work. Downes argues that “decadence is a crucial yet often 
misunderstood aspect of European modernism” (back cover). It 
should be viewed, he argues, not only as a form of degeneration 
but also as one of renewal. This runs the danger of reinstating 
the conventional morality that decadence so signally rejected, a 
paradox that is probably unavoidable in any study of the subject 
and one that Downes doesn’t entirely escape despite addressing it 
intelligently. The breadth of the material discussed and the depth 
of the scholarship brought to bear by Downes on this matter are 
astounding, as are the subtlety of his readings. There is one 
major qualification though: as impressive as his bibliography is, 
both in sheer size and in intellectual ambition, it is 
overwhelmingly dominated by English-language titles. It’s as if 
 
Downes refers to publications in the language of the particular 
culture under study only if and when he absolutely has to. We seem 
to have reached a stage where what members of a community think 
about their own culture no longer needs to concern us; only the 
thoughts of Anglophone writers, or those selected to be translated 
into English (in whatever quality) are taken into account. 
     The core of the book is arguably made up of the triad: Wagner 
– Nietzsche – (Thomas) Mann. This opens up another slight problem, 
one that is surprising considering that Downes built his 
reputation on authoritative studies of the Polish composer Karol 
Szymanowski: the model of cultural change and innovation that is 
implicit in this book is that of center and periphery, with ideas 
emanating from the Austro-German musical and intellectual 
“heartlands” being adopted, usually with a time lag, in the far-
flung provinces of the Austro-Hungarian or Russian empire. I 
assume that this wasn't Downes's intention, but it is instructive 
to see how all chapters either begin with or go back to at least 
one of the central figures named above, and how most if not all 
the critical terms and analytical concepts are derived from a 
discussion of their work and are subsequently applied to other 
figures. To be sure, Downes covers a broad range of “non-Germanic” 
composers, both canonical and not--Tchaikovsky, Karłowicz, Bartók, 
Rachmaninov, Lyadov, Szymanowski (curiously the Czech lands are 
overlooked)--but the space devoted to them is dwarfed by that 
given to Wagner, Strauss, Wolf, Mahler, Berg, Schreker, and 
Schoenberg. 
 
     Perhaps my most substantial reservation, however, concerns 
methodology. The back cover accurately describes Downes's approach 
thus: “Through the use of critical and cultural theory . . . 
musical works are contextualized, and the relationship of music 
and musical discourse to wider cultural issues is scrutinized.” 
The method is further characterized as “combining close analysis 
with hermeneutic interpretation.” The procedure is indebted to 
Lawrence Kramer's idea of the “hermeneutic window”, which was very 
influential during the 1990s (Kramer is repeatedly cited 
approvingly, although this particular text is not mentioned).1 My 
concern is not over the question of whether music has meaning, 
which is arguably overrated. Rather, the more important questions 
are, among others, what sort of meaning does music have, for whom, 
and where does it reside? The problem with the idea of hermeneutic 
windows is that music is read in conjunction with preconceived 
ideas derived from the wider cultural history of the era (usually 
contemporary writers). The process is a bit like viewing Rorschach 
tests: once something has been suggested to us, it becomes 
tempting to see the image in that way. Likewise, once we have been 
asked to hear music as expressive of ideas related to decadence, 
those aspects of the music most supportive of such a view become 
more sharply focused. But any such interpretation emphasizes 
certain aspects of the object at the expense of others: once you 
have identified the inkblot, say, as a rabbit, you become blind to 
its actual morphological properties. Moreover, you can only see an 
image as representing one object at a time (either rabbit or 
 
chicken, never a rabbit and chicken); ambiguity is closed down. In 
the same way, while musical hemerneuticists typically go out of 
their way to point out that their interpretation is just one of 
many possible interpretations, the “one meaning at a time” nature 
of their interpretations makes it impossible for them to conceive 
of genuine ambiguity. Moreover, those aspects of the music that 
seem congruent with the reading are emphasized over those that 
aren't.  
     These basic problems of hermeneutic methodology reappear in 
Downes’s account at a structural level. In deriving the 
characteristics of decadence primarily from writers--the 
aforementioned Nietzsche, Mann and Wagner--Downes establishes an 
association between ideas and musical structures that is 
subsequently rediscovered, with more or less justification, in 
other musical works. Wagner is particularly important in this 
process, since his dual status as both writer and composer allows 
for a plausible linking of literary ideas to musical structure. 
But while it is one thing to make this connection within Wagner’s 
own oeuvre, it is another to extend that connection to cover a 
wide range of composers whose efforts may not have been so easily 
assimilated into this creative picture. Note how musical 
decadence, then, occurs typically at one remove: the music is 
expressive of ideas identified first in writings. Though some of 
those writings, such as Baudelaire's and Nietzsche's, responded to 
Wagner, their readings of his music are guided primarily by the 
operatic plots and not by specifically musical structures. Take as 
 
a counter-example, the modernism of Schoenberg's music. Although 
it is possible and fruitful to relate Schoenberg's modernism to 
that of Joyce, Schnitzler, or Kandinsky, it would be perverse to 
argue that his music owes its modernism to such a comparison. Its 
modernism is primary and sui generis. This is not the case, it 
seems to me, with the majority of the cases discussed by Downes. 
     Granted, Downes is a very subtle and theoretically astute 
analyst (much more so than Kramer, for instance) and there are few 
cases where I would directly contradict his readings. 
Nevertheless, another limitation is arguably his overwhelming 
concern with pitch structure. This is problematic in itself, but 
the issue is exacerbated by his apparent conviction that the 
connotative meanings of certain structures are essentially 
invariant. Thus, time and again, a minor sixth resolving down to 
the fifth is “tragic,” the minor subdominant a “symbol of 
suffering” (301), and the chord of the flat submediant (a favorite 
harmonic device in the nineteenth century) “doomed, ephemeral, 
[and unstable]” (102). At this stage, Downes quotes Susan McClary, 
according to whom the flat submediant's “deviance [from the 
diatonic] intensifies its functional instability--its unnatural 
generation demands resolution all the more” (102). This assumption 
of diatonic normativity is quite problematic for a repertoire in 
which chromatic harmony is fully normalized. While some of these 
chromaticisms may not entirely lose their former associations, to 
assume that they remain unchanged is contentious at best. The 
problem here is an inappropriate teleology based on the 
 
deficiencies of traditional harmonic theory. Since the latter was 
grounded in diatonic functions (triads based on the primary steps 
of the scale without accidentals), chromatic harmony appeared 
either as a degeneration of diatonicism (with chromatic harmonies 
as “deviant” doppelgänger of their diatonic counterparts), or as a 
transitional phase towards atonality or indeed dodecaphony. 
Downes's argument relies heavily on such teleological narratives 
of decline or progress. Yet, there is nothing about chromatic 
harmony per se that justifies such readings. It is a different 
kind of harmony than either diatonic or atonal, but it has its own 
logic and is not transitional as such (it would be just as 
possible to regard diatonic harmony as a transition between modal 
and chromatic harmony). It is instructive in this context that, 
although Downes cites neo-Riemannian theory, he does not employ it 
himself (the one occasion when he tries to do so [143] includes a 
basic mistake). Neo-Riemannian theory is an approach to chromatic 
harmony that describes its own underlying logic without recourse 
to a supposedly normative diatonic system. For instance, the flat 
submediant is easily explained in neo-Riemannian theory: there is 
nothing inherently “deviant” about it. If viewed through a neo-
Riemannian lens, would it still be possible to call the repertoire 
discussed here “decadent”? 
     The problems don't quite end there: Downes frequently refers 
to the associations of keys, particularly when discussing operas. 
There is a lot to be said in general about focusing on pitch 
structure when discussing opera; after all, it's not what the 
 
audience is most concerned with. More specifically, Downes makes a 
lot of how, for instance, in Strauss's Salome, the Neapolitan D 
minor is “associated . . . with Jewishness” (158). Not only is it 
questionable that this association would be made by audiences, it 
is virtually impossible: it requires perfect pitch, sole focus on 
the pitch structure (as if nothing else demands their attention) 
and an ability to compare, recall, and relate key centers. So, 
what basis is there for positing aspects of musical meaning that 
cannot be heard? This brings me back to my earlier remarks about 
musical meaning. The question is not what music can mean or can be 
made to mean, but for whom it has what kind of meaning, and where 
that meaning resides. There is a wealth of material and no 
shortage of perceptive observations about music and decadence in 
this book, but what it really says about music's role in a wider 
cultural context and how it relates and contributes to surrounding 
debates is not clear to me. 
     British Music and Modernism, 1895-1960 does not suffer from 
the same problems. One reason for this, though, is that it is much 
less ambitious. Indeed, perhaps the biggest problem is that the 
raison d'être of the book is not entirely clear. The title is 
cunning, though, and Matthew Riley, in his introduction, draws 
attention to the “and” (3), which leaves open the question of 
whether the two terms in the title meet or remain irreconcilable; 
a question to which the book as a whole does not provide a firm 
answer. So, what is the intention? “This book is not the last word 
on British music and modernism before 1960. . . . Its main 
 
contribution lies in the application of new ideas and theoretical 
approaches. . . . The book is not intended as an exercise in 
affirmative 're-branding'” (3). This isn't exactly revisionist (or 
particularly programmatic in any other way). Granted, there is 
more detail on the “new ideas and theoretical approaches,” but in 
this respect, too, the book is not more than the sum of its parts. 
Whatever innovative approaches found within are due to the 
individual persuasions of the contributors; no overall theoretical 
angle or ideological perspective emerges (not that that's 
necessarily a bad thing). As far as newness is concerned, while 
contributors' approaches are obviously more or less advanced or up 
to date, there is no truly groundbreaking stuff here. Indeed, as 
if the subject matter influenced the theoretical approaches, quite 
a lot of work is noticeably cautious and resistant to, or 
uninterested in, “Theory.” Instead, there is a lot of sober 
historical work (one hesitates to use the p-word--positivism): on 
liberal music critics in the post-Victorian age (Matthew Riley), 
Elgar reception in the Manchester Guardian (Meirion Hughes), 
changes in the reception of Schoenberg's work (Deborah Heckert), 
the work of Diaghilev and the Ballets Russes in London (Gareth 
Thomas), etc. Much of this work is illuminating, although at times 
over-long. In other instances, the case seems overstated. While, 
for example, Heckert is clearly on to something when relating the 
sudden shift in the reception of Schoenberg to the impact of art 
criticism on musical debates, her linking this to the specific 
influence of Roger Fry seems tenuous. While the discourse employed 
 
by the critics writing on the 1914 performance of Schoenberg's 
Five Orchestral Pieces seems generally informed by contemporary 
art criticism, it is notable that they do not employ Fry's terms. 
Meanwhile, in his apparent attempt to provide a comprehensive 
chronicle of the reception of the Ballets Russes in London, Thomas 
misses a trick by not looking more deeply into the changing 
attitudes to gender, sexuality, ethnicity, modernism, and 
cosmopolitanism behind the sharp decline in popularity during the 
1920s. He cites some fascinating material (among, on the whole, 
too many, too extensive quotations), which sadly remains largely 
unexamined. Where a larger theoretical framework is invoked, 
things don't always go well. In Thomas Irvine's usage, Hans Ulrich 
Gumbrecht's concepts of “codes” (e.g. “Authenticity vs. 
Artificiality”) and “collapsing codes” (e.g. “Authenticity = 
Artificiality”) seem little more than a lukewarm reheating of 
dialectics (199), and indeed Irvine indulges in rather problematic 
binaries. Constant Lambert, who, elsewhere in the book (in Tim 
Barringer's contribution), is portrayed as a champion of jazz and 
a formidable reciter of William Walton and Edith Sitwell's 
Façades, is constantly painted as a proponent of art for art's 
sake, just so that Irvine's chosen hero, Walter Leigh, is set off 
to better advantage. To call Lambert a “minor denizen of 
Bloomsbury” is as unjust as regarding his Music Ho! as 
sympathizing with “the kind of modernism that privileges the 
artist's hermetic utterance” (206).2 
 
     The cornerstone of the book is arguably provided by two 
contrasting readings of Vaughan-Williams's Third and Fourth 
Symphonies, respectively. The clue is that Daniel Grimley reads 
the Third “Pastoral” Symphony, which is commonly regarded as one 
of the composer's most conservative, as modernist, while J. P. E. 
Harper-Scott questions the modernist credentials of what is 
usually seen as the most progressive of Vaughan Williams’s works, 
the “Antic” Fourth Symphony. There is no direct contradiction 
here, as both argue along different lines, Grimley privileging 
cultural meaning and analyzing musical structures accordingly and 
Harper-Scott focusing on formalist analysis (although he is by no 
means blind to cultural meaning). Both contributions are 
impressive. Grimley challenges the still dominant assumption that 
the pastoralism of the Third represents a nostalgic evocation of 
“the green and pleasant land” (of England), relating it instead to 
the battlefields of the Somme and understanding it as an 
expression of mourning. Harper-Scott, by contrast, argues that the 
high levels of dissonance in Vaughan-Williams's Fourth Symphony 
are little more than parodic surface elements superimposed on an 
essentially consonant, tonal, diatonic background structure, 
which, contrary to, for instance, Stravinsky's use of parody, are 
not used to modernist ends. To demonstrate this, Harper-Scott 
presents extraordinarily complex Schenkerian graphs. Sophisticated 
though this analysis undoubtedly is, it raises a number of 
questions. Is the strict distinction between surface and 
structure, which Harper-Scott's discussion relies on, really 
 
appropriate from a modernist perspective? Are his repeated 
normative invocations of what is “quite unthinkable in a modernist 
work” (191), or, in other words, what modernist works should be 
like, justifiable? Is Schenkerian analysis the final arbiter on 
whether a work is modernist or not? As Earle points out in his 
contribution, modernism “cannot be said to reside merely in the 
presence of certain technical features: dissonance, atonality, 
rhythmic/metrical dislocation, 12-note technique, heightened 
structural ambiguity and so forth” (316). 
     The book is concluded with two studies devoted to the 
composers who probably have the best claim to be the first genuine 
British modernists: Elizabeth Lutyens and Humphrey Searle–-
although it is important to note that both would appear moderate 
or even timid when compared to their contemporaries on the 
continent. Laurel Parsons makes a plausible case that Lutyens's 
claim of having been inspired to embrace dodecaphony by Henry 
Purcell is much less fanciful than it may first seem. Why this 
argument required quite so much biographical story-telling is not 
clear however, nor why it needs to be couched in such clichéd 
dichotomies as “boldness, originality and experimentation” (270) 
and “courage to defy convention” (274) on one side vs. “the 
nostalgic pastoralism characteristic of much British music of the 
early twentieth century” on the other (270). One doesn't have to 
fully sign up to Grimley's view to see that it is a little more 
complicated than that, and that's the one lesson that comes out 
loud and clear in this book.  
 
     I have already cited Ben Earle's contribution approvingly, 
and indeed his spirited advocacy on behalf of Humphrey Searle, in 
particular his First Symphony (1953), is timely and convincing. 
That is not to deny, however, that a number of odd notes are 
sounded here. In regarding Searle as unjustly neglected, Earle 
seems to find it necessary to polemicize against a later 
generation of British modernist composers, particularly the so-
called Manchester School of the 1960s. Consisting primarily of 
Walter Goehr, Peter Maxwell Davies, and Harrison Birtwistle, the 
Manchester School were more readily accepted by their contemporary 
critics and audiences than Searle had been around a decade 
earlier. This is, Earle suggests, quoting Paul Griffiths, due to 
the by then more “propitious” cultural climate (301). Instead of 
attempting to redress the balance, Earle seems to argue that 
Searle's rejection by predominantly unsympathetic critics and 
audiences is proof of his authentic modernism, whereas the 
widespread acceptance of the Manchester School demonstrates that 
their modernism is only skin-deep. Earle is justified in pointing 
to the problematic of the institutionalization of modernism but he 
seems strangely unaware of the irony that, according to his own 
logic, his advocacy undermines the very modernist credentials that 
he so prizes in Searle (elsewhere, on pp. 293-4 and pp. 297-300, 
he seems to have no hesitation to regard academic interest as a 
sign of institutionalization which he views as inimical to true 
modernism). In rejecting the institutionalization of modernism (a 
regrettable but most likely unavoidable process), Earle maneuvers 
 
himself into a corner: “one wonders whether 'propitious 
circumstances' for modernism might not be the opposite of what 
[Griffiths] has in mind. Is it not precisely unpropitiousness that 
is modernism's essential prerequisite?” (300). This returns us to 
the worst clichés of modernism-as-suffering and modernism-as-
refusal: the visionary artist who suffers Christ-like for the 
philistinism of the bourgeoisie and who regards rejection as 
approbation and success as failure. Indeed, Searle quotes the more 
problematic sections of Adorno's Philosophy of New Music in 
support of his position. In this world view, Adrian Leverkühn is 
the only true modernist composer–-no wonder he is fictional. 
What's more, the occasion for the Adornian connection is tenuous. 
Earle points to a “failure of musical continuity, of communication 
even” (314) between bars 70 and 75 in the first movement of the 
First Symphony. Rather than regarding the music as poorly 
composed, Earle argues that “it would be more productive to read 
the faltering coherence of this music as stemming from necessity, 
a necessity that for Adorno, of course, would have the full force 
of history behind it” (315). What if this is no heroic failure, 
but just a technical deficiency, and a rather slight one at that? 
That is a rather more likely explanation given that Searle himself 
admitted that he had no model in adapting dodecaphony to the 
requirements of the symphony. There is a lot to be said for 
raising Searle's status, but there is no need to base his 
modernist credentials on a shop-worn suffering-hero narrative, nor 
on belittling the status of others who faced fewer difficulties, 
 
nor on aggrandizing slight flaws as failures of communication that 
have the full force of history behind them. 
     On the whole, the book enriches and deepens our understanding 
of British music and modernism, but it doesn't substantially alter 
it, but maybe that would be too much to ask --and maybe it doesn't 
need altering. 
     Metzer's book, finally, brings us to the present, or at least 
the immediate past. His intention is to prove that “Modernism . . 
. remains vital. It has not been supplanted [by postmodernism]. It 
draws upon a wealth of ideals and precedents and is fueled by 
continuing impulses” (1). To that purpose he undertakes two kinds 
of inquiries: into what he calls “compositional states” and “the 
act of expression” (8). The compositional states are purity, 
silence, the fragmentary, lament, and sonic flux, each of which is 
given a chapter. Metzer claims novelty for this approach. To be 
honest, I have not quite understood what a compositional state is 
and what really distinguishes it from, say, a theme. In terms of 
the latter, Metzer is by no means the first scholar to study the 
use or evocation of silence, for instance, and his actual analyses 
are not radically unlike previous studies, but never mind. And why 
would these states be modernist and indeed act as touchstones for 
identifying modernism? Again, I am not entirely sure, although it 
would seem that the argument becomes circular here: they are 
modernist because modernist composers employ them. It is also 
noteworthy that in the earlier chapters, Metzer pairs the 
composers who form the primary focus of his study with earlier 
 
ones whose modernist credentials are already safely established: 
Stockhausen-–(Jonathan) Harvey (“Chapter 1: Purity”); Webern-–
Nono–-Sciarrino (“Chapter 2: Modern Silence”); Nono-–Kurtág 
(“Chapter 3: the Fragmentary”). Once the procedure is established, 
this grounding in “the classics” is gradually abolished: Ligeti–-
Saariaho (“Chapter 4: Lament”); Saariaho–-Lachenmann-–(Olga) 
Neuwirth (“Chapter 5: Sonic Flux”). 
     Whatever the epistemological status and consistency of the 
analytical terms chosen, Metzer puts them to good use. He is a 
fine writer and subtle critic, and his readings are rarely less 
than illuminating. He is also the only writer covered here who 
draws from secondary literature in several languages (English, 
French, and German) in almost equal measure. His studies of 
Kurtág's Kafka Fragments and Lachenmann's Das Mädchen mit den 
Schwefelhölzern are particularly inspiring. At some points, 
though, he obsesses about minutiae in the scores that are not 
directly related to the actual music. For instance, he makes much 
of the fact that the mandolin's part is “the loudest (piano)” in 
Webern's Five Pieces for Orchestra Op. 10/4. In fact, though, 
Webern almost certainly notated dynamics pragmatically, rather 
than literally, to create the right sounding balance between 
naturally soft and loud instruments. The passage in question 
features a melodic line passing from the mandolin to the muted 
trumpet, muted trombone and, after a break, muted violin. In all 
likelihood, the line is meant to change color but not volume 
between mandolin, trumpet and trombone, and in order to achieve 
 
that, Webern had to notate the latter two with softer dynamics (I 
also don't hear the movement as fragmented as Metzer would have us 
believe). Similar to Downes, this preoccupation with the score, at 
the expense of performance, is a particular problem in Metzer's 
approach to opera, as in the case of the Lachenmann and Neuwirth's 
Lost Highway (on David Lynch's film). 
     My real concern, though, is with Metzer's weaknesses as a 
theorist. Given his undisputed strengths as a critic, this perhaps 
shouldn't matter so much, but, as the title of his book makes 
clear, he wants it to be more than a series of critical essays on 
individual pieces, and this is where the problems begin. 
Throughout the book there is little sense of what musical 
modernism is for, what its social function might be other than to 
serve the aesthetic delectation of a small, highly educated, 
cultured and overwhelmingly upper middle-class elite and, pace 
Bourdieu, to allow them to show off their cultural capital. In the 
introduction, modernism is almost exclusively defined through 
material and compositional technique. Astonishingly enough, though 
Metzer cites Adorno extensively, he does so only in relation to 
the Materialstand (the objective state of the material) and 
subjectivity; there is no concern with the social and ideological 
functions of new music, which is what drove Adorno to raise these 
issues in the first place. This neglect of social function and 
ideological meaning also seems to be behind Metzer's choice of 
period. Time and again, he argues that the time around 1980 marks 
an important shift between an emphasis on construction in the 
 
post-war period and the concern for subjectivity (18) or, indeed, 
“music of expressive candor and immediacy” (19) in the late-
modernist works. So what happened with the 1960s and 1970s? 
Repeatedly, Metzer switches between the post-war or even pre-war 
avant-gardes (in the case of Webern) and the late modernism of the 
1980s and after, but he never really alights on anything in 
between. It may well be that he simply doesn't know this music 
very well (there are some signs of that), but maybe this avoidance 
also has something to do with his conflicted approach to 
postmodernism. While he on one hand seems to argue that the 
familiar modernism/postmodernism dichotomy is obsolete, on the 
other he is hesitant to deal with any music that could be 
described as postmodernist (and which might well share his 
compositional states). In the end, in a curiously imperialistic, 
hegemonic image, he draws up an imaginary map centering on 
modernism and pluralism (245-246)-–an odd technique given that he 
shows no interest in actual cultural geography, seeming instead to 
take the unmarked universalism of modernist music at face value. 
So modernism has simply become the mainstream, a default option, 
with separate tendencies in “removed lands” (246) but still 
defined by the main continent. And there was I thinking that 
modernism might have something to do with resistance. 
     There is another reason why the emphasis on 1980 is 
concerning. It excludes 1968 and the hey-day of socially and 
politically committed music.3 Indeed, for many, 1980 marked the 
moment of resignation (particularly in the case of Nono, a life-
 
                     
long radical Marxist) coinciding with the rise of neo-conservatism 
(it would be facile to draw a causal connection, but it's clearly 
more than an accidental correlation). From that perspective, the 
return to expression that Metzer diagnoses and indeed celebrates 
takes on a more problematic undertone: is this anything more than 
the restitution of bourgeois subjectivity concomitant with the 
withdrawal from political engagement into the private sphere? 
While it is a cause for celebration to see recent modernist music 
discussed by a serious English-speaking scholar, this is the kind 
of question that such a study should ask, and this Metzer fails to 
do. 
     The lesson to be drawn from these three, quite different 
books is that while there is a lot to be said for a broad and 
inclusive definition of musical modernism, we should be wary of 
diluting the concept too far by including everything produced 
within ever widening historical boundaries and by losing sight of 
its radical and subversive potential. 
 
1 Lawrence Kramer, “Tropes and Windows: An Outline of Musical Hermeneutics,” 
Music as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990), 1-20. 
2 Constant Lambert, Music Ho! A Study of Music in Decline (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1933). 
3 Recent accounts of the impact of 1968 on music include Robert Adlington, ed., 
Sound Commitments: Avant-garde Music and the Sixties (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), Arnold Jacobshagen and Markus Leniger, eds., 
Rebellische Musik: Gesellschaftlicher Protest und kultureller Wandel um 1968 
(Cologne: Dohr, 2007), and Beate Kutschke, Neue Linke/Neue Musik: 
                                                                     
Kulturtheorien und künstlerische Avantgarde in den 1960er and 70er Jahren 
(Cologne: Böhlau, 2007). 
